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This paper discusses issues raised for OECD agricultural and agriculture-related policies by the policy 
coherence for development perspective. These issues are organised in a five-fold typology covering 
OECD domestic agricultural policy, agricultural trade policy, regulatory policies, development 
cooperation policy as well as the coherence of developing country policies. Changes in OECD 
agricultural policy have varying impacts on different groups of developing countries, and on different 
groups within developing countries. The message for policy coherence for development analysis is 
that specifics count, and that impacts need to be assessed on a country by country basis. Bringing a 
policy coherence perspective to the debates on OECD agricultural policy reform requires a careful 
classification of the various channels whereby developing countries are impacted by this reform, not 
least so as to identify ways in which development assistance can be used so as to maximise the 
opportunities it creates but also to help to mitigate adverse impacts where they occur. The paper 
concludes with a checklist of actions which might be taken by the development policy community to 
improve the coherence of agricultural and development policy with development objectives. 
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This paper was presented at the OECD Global Forum on Agriculture: Policy Coherence for 
Development, 30 November – 1 December 2005, Paris, France under the title “Policy coherence for 
development: Issues in agriculture”. It is an output of the Policy Coherence project based in the 
Institute for International Integration Studies at Trinity College Dublin supported by a research grant 
from the Advisory Board for Development Cooperation Ireland.   3
Introduction 
 
Policy coherence for development is a process whereby a government, in pursuing its domestic policy 
objectives, makes an effort to design policies that, at a minimum, avoid negative spillovers which would 
adversely affect the development prospects of poor countries and, more positively, seek to maximise 
synergies. In this contribution, we take stock of what we know about the extent to which the agriculture 
and agricultural-related policies of OECD countries are incoherent with their stated development 
objectives.  
 
Policy coherence has a particular importance in the case of agriculture, given the first Millennium 
Development Goal target of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, and the fact that three quarters of the 
world’s poor live in rural areas. OECD agricultural policies have a significant impact on the trade and 
development opportunities available to developing countries, and it is important to bring a development 
perspective to the debates on OECD agricultural policy reform. This impact is a nuanced one: among 
developing countries, there are winners and losers from OECD agricultural policy. Changes in OECD 
agricultural policy have varying impacts on different groups of developing countries, and on different 
groups within developing countries. Bringing a policy coherence perspective to the debates on OECD 
agricultural policy reform requires a careful classification of the various channels whereby developing 
countries are impacted by this reform, not least so as to identify ways in which development assistance can 
be used so as to maximise the opportunities it creates by agricultural policy reform but also to help to 
mitigate adverse impacts where they occur. 
 
This paper builds on an earlier overview paper prepared for the OECD Horizontal Project on Policy 
Coherence Policy Coherence for Development: Issues in Agriculture (OECD, 2005). We first review the 
typology used in that paper to discuss agriculture-related issues and policy coherence. We then draw some 
lessons based on empirical and other work in the literature concerning the relationship between OECD 
agricultural policies and development. Based on recent work we are conducting with partners in two 
African least developed countries, Tanzania and Uganda, we conclude with a checklist for development 
agencies wishing to pursue a policy coherence agenda with respect to agricultural policy.
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What we are discussing 
 
Table 1 presents a typology of agriculture and agricultural-related policies relevant to the policy coherence 
debate. Five policy domains are distinguished. Domestic agricultural policy objectives in OECD 
countries include those concerned with equity or distributional issues, such as support for the incomes of 
farm households, and those designed to correct market failures (OECD, 2003). Support for domestic 
agricultural production is also justified as a way of achieving social objectives such as the protection of 
family farming, the maintenance of a dispersed rural population or support for the cultural heritage of 
farming areas. Many argue that these non-food outputs reflect the multifunctional nature of agricultural 
production. Social and income objectives in the agricultural sector in OECD countries have been addressed 
largely through market price support and, to a lesser extent, income transfers. Market price support policies 
require that the domestic market is insulated from the world market. A country which seeks to maintain a 
domestic market price above the world market price will find it necessary to impose a trade barrier, as 
otherwise cheaper imports would undermine the domestic policy. Thus both trade and domestic policies 
designed to support agricultural output and incomes in OECD countries are jointly considered under the 
first policy domain. 
 
                                                      
1 This project, the Policy Coherence project being carried out at the Institute for International Integration Studies at 
Trinity College Dublin, is supported by the Advisory Board for Development Cooperation Ireland. Further details at 
www.tcd.ie/iiis/policycoherence.   4
Table 1. Policy coherence between agriculture and development policies – a framework 
 
Policy actor  Policy domain  Examples of policy instruments affecting 
agricultural development in developing countries 
OECD countries  Domestic agricultural 
policy 
Market price support, direct payments, export subsidies, 
income support, risk management measures, investment 
and structural adjustment assistance 
OECD countries  Agricultural trade policy  Regional trade agreements, trade preferences, tariff 
escalation, attitudes to developing country demands in 
international trade negotiations, international 
commodity agreements 
OECD countries  Regulatory policies 
affecting agricultural 
production and trade 
Non-tariff measures addressing food safety, food 
quality, environmental protection and conservation, 
intellectual property protection, geographical 
indications 
OECD countries  Development co-
operation policy  
Development aid to the agricultural sector, food aid, 





trade and agriculture 
Agricultural trade policies, institutional reform, 
exchange rate policies, investment and infrastructure 
policies 
Source: OECD, 2005. 
Agricultural trade policy is the second policy domain where policy coherence issues arise. This 
recognises that agricultural trade policy is not only designed to play a supporting role to domestic 
agricultural policy, but may also be used to pursue other objectives in its own right. Trade policy may be 
used to promote regional integration objectives, as a development instrument through the award of trade 
preferences, or to protect the domestic food processing sector through tariff escalation. Trade policy is also 
concerned with the international architecture of trade rules. Policy coherence questions arise in examining 
the stance which OECD countries take in international trade negotiations on agricultural trade issues of 
relevance to developing countries, or with respect to problems in international commodity markets and the 
difficulties these cause for commodity-dependent developing countries. This is the ‘foreign policy’ aspect 
of agricultural trade policy, as distinct from its use as an adjunct to domestic agricultural policy which is 
discussed in the first domain. 
A characteristic of OECD country food systems is the growing importance of regulatory interventions 
aimed at ensuring food safety, consumer protection, environmental protection and intellectual property 
protection. The requirement to meet specific regulatory standards before a product can be sold on the 
domestic market is not usually aimed specifically at imported products. Nonetheless, even where this is not 
the case, standards have an indirect influence on agricultural output and trade. Policy coherence analysis 
must take account of the growing importance of these non-tariff measures in OECD countries and their 
implications for development. 
The fourth relevant OECD policy domain is development cooperation policy and the extent to which it is 
used to help minimise conflicts and maximise synergies between agricultural policy reform and 
development objectives. How far does development cooperation policy provide support for the agricultural 
sector of developing countries and its integration into global markets? PCD issues here include the 
magnitude of aid flows to promote agriculture in developing countries, aid coordination and the role of 
specific types of aid flows such as food aid and trade capacity-building. Another relevant issue under this 
heading is potential compensation measures to address problems of preference erosion arising from 
agricultural policy reform. 
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Finally, policy coherence also place an obligation on developing countries to pursue policies which take 
advantage of the opportunities that arise as OECD countries improve the developmental coherence of their 
own policies. The need to ensure adequate incentives for farm production, to provide adequate budgetary 
support for growth-promoting agricultural policies and rural infrastructure, to pursue consistent agricultural 
and agricultural trade policies, and to support institutional development and the involvement of the private 
sector and civil society in decision-making are relevant issues to consider in this context.  
Channels of impact 
 
Policy coherence analysis in agriculture requires an understanding of the way in which OECD agricultural 
policy impacts on developing countries. The primary mechanism is through the world market impacts of 
the policy, particularly the level and stability of world prices. World price changes influence the terms of 
trade of developing countries, and will have an initial positive or negative impact depending on whether 
these countries are net exporters or importers of the product in question. Further indirect effects will occur 
as these changes in border prices are reflected through national trade policies and domestic marketing 
system into changes in domestic market prices for producers and consumers. In turn, households will be 
affected by these domestic price changes depending on whether they are net producers or net consumers of 
these commodities, by consequential changes in factor market conditions resulting from the impact of the 
reforms, and by decisions made by the government on how it responds to changes in its revenue base. 
These channels are summarised in Figure 1 and provide the framework for the analysis which follows. 
Figure 1.  Analysing the impact of OECD agricultural policy reform on developing countries 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Brooks, 2003. 
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The status of agricultural policy 
 
Any discussion of policy coherence for development and agricultural policy must begin from an analysis of 
OECD agricultural policy and how it is changing over time. OECD has developed the PSE/CSE 
methodology to provide a summary indicator of the magnitude of policy interventions in agriculture. 
Transfers to farmers since the mid-1980s have changed relatively little in absolute terms but have declined 
when expressed as a proportion of the value of agricultural output. 
 
Table 1. OECD indicators of support to agriculture 
 
Indicator 1986-88  1993-95  2002-04 
PSE   
Billion $  243 269  254
Percentage PSE  37 33  30
CSE   
Percentage CSE  -32 -26  -21
NPC (producer)  1.57 1.40  1.29
NAC (producer)  1.60 1.50  1.44
TSE   
Billion $  306 364  346
Percentage TSE in GDP  2.3 1.7  1.2
Source: OECD PSE/CSE database, Paris, 2005 
 
Looking only at the magnitude of PSE transfers is not necessarily a good indication of their trade-distorting 
effect. Transfers are generated by a wide variety of policies, some of which impact on trade opportunities 
more than others. This is recognised in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in the distinction between 
amber, blue and green box policies. Market price support is generally recognised as the most trade-
distorting element in the PSE. OECD countries have been gradually changing their policies in a less trade-
distorting direction. Nonetheless, market price support still constitutes 60 per cent of the total support 
provided to OECD farmers (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Changing composition of OECD producer support 
 
  Source: OECD, PSE/CSE database, Paris, 2005   7
 
Developing country impacts of OECD agricultural country policies 
 
It is then an empirical question to determine the impact which these domestic OECD transfers have on 
developing countries. There is now a wealth of empirical studies available which have tried to analyse 
these effects (see Charlton and Stiglitz, 2004 for studies up to 2003, and Ackerman, 2005 for a review of 
more recent GTAP and World Bank results) All studies agree that the removal of trade-distorting 
agricultural policies would generate global welfare gains, but two conclusions can be highlighted here. 
First, differences in model methodologies, assumptions, parameter estimates and policy simulations mean 
that there is considerable variation in the estimates obtained. One exercise undertaken by the World Bank 
modelling team illustrates the fragility of these estimates and the difficulty which policy-makers have in 
interpreting them. Five scenarios were run using the same database but with varying model assumptions. 
The initial scenario, the 2015 base case, compares the results in 2015 from a base run using the Bank’s 
dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) LINKAGE model with a scenario in which all support to 
agricultural production is eliminated. Because the global economy in 2015 will be approximately one-third 
bigger than in 2001, scaling back these effects to the impact such a scenario would have in 2001 reduces 
these estimates. Removing the dynamic element of the model eliminates the cumulative reinvestment from 
a larger economy each year and further reduces the estimated impact. Replacing the behavioural and trade 
elasticities used in the base case by those recommended for use in the GTAP model, a widely-used CGE 
model for trade policy analysis, results in a further reduction. Finally, making the assumption that all 
factors including land are fixed and using the GTAP elasticities produces the lowest estimate of global 
welfare gains, and the estimated impacts on Sub-Saharan Africa turn negative. 
 
Table 2. Effect of varying model assumptions on welfare gains from global merchandise trade 
liberalisation 
 









GTAP elas + 
fixed land 
World  287.3  156.4  127.4  88.5  77.8 
Dev countries  85.7  43.9  23.7  10.6  2.0 
Sub Saharan Africa  4.8  2.8  0.7  0.2  -0.1 
South Africa  1.3  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.4 
Selected SSA countries  1.0  0.6  0.3  0.4  0.3 
Rest of SSA  2.5  1.4  -0.2  -0.6  -0.8 
Source: Anderson, Martin and Van der Mensbrugge, 2005. 
 
Second, more recent estimates of global gains tend to be more modest than earlier ones. For example, early 
World Bank numbers based on dynamic as well as static gains suggested overall gains from agricultural 
trade liberalisation of $280-630 billion of which $110-250 billion would accrue to developing countries 
(World Bank, 2003). This compares to more recent World Bank estimates of $182 billion of which $56 
billion would accrue to developing countries (Anderson et al., 2005) and lower estimates from the GTAP 
model of $56 billion of which just $12 billion would accrue to developing countries (Hertel and Keeney, 
2006). The lower estimates come about because some liberalisation occurred following the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture; because studies now use applied tariff rates which are often much lower 
than bound tariffs; and because studies now take better account of agricultural trade under preferences. 
 
Furthermore, we should be careful to avoid the fallacy of identifying the potential gains of developing 
countries from agricultural trade liberalisation with the damage caused by OECD agricultural policies. All 
studies agree that the main beneficiaries from agricultural policy reform are the countries which undertake 
the reform. Developing countries provide high levels of nominal support to their agricultural sectors, and   8
much of the estimated gain from reform comes from their own liberalisation. The direct impact of OECD 
agricultural policy reform on these countries is more modest. In the more recent World Bank study, 
developing countries gain $26 billion from OECD agricultural policy reform alone, just half of the overall 
gain they would get from global agricultural trade liberalisation (Anderson et al., 2005). Hertel and Keeney 
(2006) using the GTAP model without dynamics find a figure of $9.5 billion as the damage to developing 
countries caused by the all OECD agricultural policies.
2 These figures compare to net ODA flows of 
around $60 billion, and aid to agriculture in 2003 of $3.9 billion (OECD, 2005).  
 
Figure 1 highlighted that the primary way in which OECD country agricultural policies affect developing 
countries is through their impact on the level and stability of world agricultural prices. If developing 
countries with a comparative advantage in producing those products protected in OECD countries are to 
gain substantially, then OECD agricultural policy reform should lead to a significant increase in world 
market prices for agricultural products. Very few studies report directly the impact of OECD country 
agricultural policy reform on world prices. Examining the predicted impact of global agricultural policy 
reform (that is, including liberalisation by developing countries themselves) reveals large variation in 
projected world price changes (see Table A1-D in Morrissey et al., 2005). The results of the study by 
Bouet et al. (2005), albeit reporting only a partial liberalisation, suggest that the changes may not be that 
significant for most commodities. This is not to argue that agricultural policy reform is not worth pursuing, 
but it does suggest that, for developing countries in aggregate, unrealistic expectations have built up 
regarding the likely benefits of more open OECD agricultural markets. 
 
Gainers and losers 
 
These aggregate results reported for developing countries as a whole conceal the fact that the impact of 
OECD agricultural policy reform will be felt very unevenly among these countries. The main gainers will 
be competitive agricultural exporters (such as Brazil, Argentina, Thailand, China) while least developed 
countries are likely to lose out and may be made worse off as a result of reform, for two reasons – they are 
largely net importers of commodities protected by OECD agricultural policy, and those countries which are 
exporters often benefit from preferential access to OECD country markets, the value of which will be 
eroded by further trade liberalisation (see Panagariya, 2005 for a trenchant critique of the argument that 
OECD country agricultural protectionism hurts the poorest countries most and that it is the principal barrier 
to the latter’s development). 
 
The importance of preferences is demonstrated in Table 3 which shows average applied bilateral tariffs 
between different country groups. Applied tariffs on imports from Sub-Saharan Africa (and, in the case of 
the EU, for imports from Mediterranean countries) are less than half those applied to imports from other 
countries. Preferences are often criticised as being of little use to developing countries. However, 
agricultural preferences are well used, and confer benefits of two kinds. One kind is a competitive 
advantage in OECD markets vis a vis other suppliers. The other – and more important – kind is the 
possibility of obtaining rents. This is the most important effect of quota-constrained access where there is 
no possibility of additional trade creation. These rents are, in effect, a form of trade-tied aid. However, 
while it is wrong to overlook the gains some developing countries derive from preferences, they cannot be 
an alternative to a multilateral reduction in trade barriers. They are fundamentally a short-term solution, 
often benefit an arbitrary group of countries and, by locking countries into uncompetitive lines of 
production, their long-run development impact is detrimental.  
 
Preference erosion is not the only reason why some developing countries may lose from further 
agricultural trade liberalisation. Net food-importing countries are also vulnerable and there is a need to 
address their concerns. Putting teeth into the Marrakesh Decision is one possible route. Making a 
                                                      
2 This estimate is very consistent with those from previous studies quoted in Matthews, 2005a.   9
commitment to the world’s poorest countries that their food import needs would be met and their import 
bills kept under control would remove one real source of concern that they have about embarking on 
further trade liberalisation. 
 
Table 3. Average applied bilateral tariffs, agricultural sector, per cent, 2001 
 
Tariffs applied by → 
Applied to ↓ 
EU25  US  Asia developed  Cairns developed 
EU25  -  5.8  22.2  15.7 
US  16.2  -  28.9  5.1 
Asia developed  12.5  3.7  -  6.2 
Cairns developed  25.9  3.4  24.9  - 
Mediterranean  7.3  4.0  14.1  3.7 
Sub Saharan Africa  6.7  3.0  12.0  0.7 
Cairns developing  18.3  3.8  24.0  5.9 
China  13.5  5.1  21.7  8.7 
South Asia  14.4  1.8  33.7  1.8 
Rest of World  15.1  2.1  17.4  2.6 
Average  16.7  4.7  22.5  10.8 
Source: Bouet et al., 2005 
 
These concerns can be illustrated by examining the likely impact of OECD country liberalisation on some 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Six countries which are programme countries for Development Co-
operation Ireland (DCI) are selected: Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Lesotho 
(referred to as DCI programme countries in the Figures below).  Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the composition 
of their food trade with the EU-15, their major market though not representing all their trade. Fully three-
quarters of their food exports comprise tropical beverages and fish, both of which are exported free of duty 
to the EU with the aid of a preferential margin against third country exporters. Almost half of their imports 
are cereals or cereal products, whose price is projected to increase following OECD agricultural policy 
reform.  
 
Figure 3. EU-15 imports from the DCI programme countries by value, 1995-2003 average 
 
 
  Source: Chaplin and Matthews, 2006, based on Eurostat.   10








































  Source: Chaplin and Matthews, 2006, based on Eurostat. 
 
It is thus not hard to understand that these countries have little to gain and indeed much to lose from OECD 
agricultural trade liberalisation. Table 4 presents the results of a specific simulation of the Harbinson 
proposals using the ATPSM model.
3 This exempted least developed countries such as Tanzania and 
Uganda from making tariff reductions and thus the results represent the impact of OECD plus developing 
country liberalisation on these two countries. The figures suggest that, overall, partial agricultural 
liberalisation will have little overall impact one way or the other on these countries. Indeed, as the ATPSM 
model cannot take account of preferences, the outcome in practice is more likely to be negative than 
positive. For the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, the simulations are even more definite that this is the more 
likely outcome. 
 
Table 4.  Welfare effects of the Harbinson proposal, $m 
 
  EU US  Tanzania  Uganda  Rest  of 
SSA 
Producer surplus  -41,258 -2,293 +47 +42 +656
Consumer surplus  +27,834 +106 -53 -42 -992
Government revenue  +20,462 +2,050 0.8 0.2 -9
Total welfare  +7,038 -136 -6 0 -345 




Just examining the aggregate welfare impacts on developing countries may underestimate the impact 
which OECD agricultural policy reform might have on poverty in these countries. As is clear from Table 4, 
aggregate impacts net out the gains to producers and losses to consumers from higher farm prices. These 
                                                      
3 ATPSM, the Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model, was jointly developed by UNCTAD and FAO. Details 
can be found on the UNCTAD ATPSM website http://192.91.247.38/tab/ATPSMabout.asp   11
distributional effects of trade liberalisation are usually far greater than the aggregate impacts, whether in 
OECD countries or in the developing world. Where poverty is concentrated among rural food producers, as 
in much of Africa, it might be expected that OECD agricultural trade liberalisation will have a pro-poor 
effect. However, if there is also preference erosion which hurts rural producers, this is not necessarily the 
outcome. As importers of supported products, they also have the option of using tariff protection to capture 
the benefits of cheaper food imports (for government revenue) while protecting the incomes of the rural 
poor. Also, in many least developed countries, poor market infrastructure means that border price changes 
never get transmitted to the rural poor in the first place. 
 
The immediate poverty impacts in middle-income countries are also ambiguous – more of the poor are 
urban food consumers who may be required to pay more for their food. Agricultural structures in middle-
income countries are also more differentiated, with a greater concentration of production on larger 
holdings; thus many of the benefits of higher world prices may go to larger landowners. The longer-term 
impacts will depend, in part, on how government distributes additional resources in a more buoyant 
economy.  
 
Empirical attempts to quantify the poverty effects of trade liberalisation are still relatively recent (see 
Hertel and Winters, 2005 for a comprehensive discussion and series of case studies, and Ackerman (2005) 
for a critique of one of these studies). Hertel and Winters find mixed outcomes for their near term analyses, 
with poverty rising in some cases and falling in others. The largest poverty reductions, in both absolute and 
relative terms, are in countries with agricultural export potential to the markets which liberalise most (i.e. 
East Asia and Europe). On the other hand, they find that poverty tends to increase in countries which are 
net importers of agricultural products and which may presently benefit from preferential market access. 
The message for policy coherence analysis is that specifics count, and that impacts need to be assessed on a 
country-by-country basis. 
 
Sequencing of reform 
 
Given the potentially conflicting nature of OECD agricultural policy reform for developing countries, it is 
worth asking whether it is possible to identify particular policy measures or particular commodities where 
the development pay-off is highest and to seek to accelerate these reforms. It is striking, for example, how 
virtually all developing countries condemn export subsidies even where, on a narrow economic analysis, 
subsidised exports would appear to benefit net-importing countries. On a commodity basis, it would be 
useful to rank commodities according to the absolute levels of damage caused by OECD agricultural 
policies although few studies report their results in this way. The scope for influencing the sequencing of 
reforms in multilateral trade negotiations where the modalities are based on formula reductions may be 
limited, but there are exceptions. For example, the WTO July 2004 Framework Agreement reiterates the 
call for ‘full implementation of the long-standing commitment to achieve the fullest liberalisation of trade 
in tropical agricultural products and for products of particular importance to the diversification of 
production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops’. Another important example is the Cotton Initiative. 
This follows the proposal made by four West African cotton producing countries to the WTO in  May 2003 
seeking a system for the reduction with a view to elimination of cotton subsidies and compensation for 
LDC cotton producers while the subsidies remain in place. Among the proposals under consideration are 
the earlier elimination of export subsidies and reduction of domestic support in the case of cotton than for 
other agricultural products under the terms of any Doha Round agreement. The negotiations on this issue 
are being guided by the July 2004 Framework Agreement commitment that ' [Cotton] will be addressed 
ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically, within the agriculture negotiations’. 
 
Regulatory barriers 
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As traditional trade barriers are reduced, regulatory barriers are on the increase and may now be more 
important obstacles to increased food exports from developing countries. Consumers are demanding higher 
food safety standards and importing countries impose detailed sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) protection 
measures in order to secure human, animal and plant health. Developing countries will be expected to meet 
these standards like other exporters. The WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards 
(SPS) is designed to reduce the trade-distorting effects of SPS measures, but many developing countries 
have concerns about the way in which the Agreement has been implemented to date. Particular concerns 
are that developed countries take insufficient account of the needs of developing countries when setting 
SPS requirements, insufficient time is allowed between notification and implementation of SPS 
requirements, and insufficient technical assistance is given to developing countries (Henson et al., 2002). 
Regulatory authorities should be made aware of the developing country perspective in the design of food 
safety, environmental protection, consumer protection and intellectual property protection measures. For 
example, the sheer complexity of regulations may itself be a prohibitive factor, and it may be possible to 
guarantee the same outcomes for human, animal and plant health with more transparent legislation. While 
it will be important to monitor the use or abuse of regulations for protectionist purposes, the longer term 
objective must be to assist developing countries to reach a position where they can meet the requirements 
of ever more demanding consumers. 
 
Increasingly, food standards standards are set by private agents (supermarket buyers) rather than 
governments. Preferred and exclusive partnerships, based on trust and audits, between supply chain 
partners are increasing. Chain transparency, including tracking and tracing systems, is increasingly 
required both to safeguard consumer health and safety of food, as well as to use as a marketing tool to 
maintain consumer trust and confidence in a brand name. For developing countries, meeting these 
standards requires investment in education, infrastructure, and hardware. The additional costs of audit and 
certification can be substantial, especially if they have to be carried out by foreign experts. The move to 
preferred suppliers may favour those developing countries with more advanced infrastructure, making it 
even more difficult for new entrants and less advantaged developing countries. 
 
Development cooperation policy 
 
Examination of trade statistics often reveals that developing countries do not appear to be taking advantage 
of market access opportunities which are open to them. Developing countries with preferential access to an 
OECD country export market often appear to lose market share to their less preferred competitors. Thus, 
even where poorer countries gain market access opportunities, turning these opportunities into additional 
trade flows will require support. Furthermore, where countries or population groups within countries may 
be potential losers, for example, from the unravelling of preferential access arrangements, there is a need to 
find ways to compensate them or to assist them to diversify.  
 
Awareness of these issues has led to a growing interest in trade-related development assistance (TRA). 
TRA covers four categories of actions: assistance for trade policy formulation and participation in 
negotiations; assistance for trade development including actions aiming at relieving supply side constraints 
which prevent developing countries exploiting their international trading potential; assistance for trade 
adjustment, including measures to mitigate the adjustment costs of trade liberalisation; and assistance to 
support trade-related infrastructure. The WTO July 2004 Framework Agreement reiterated the need to 
further increase TRA. OECD countries have indicated their support for this objective at various 
opportunities, including at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles in July 2005 and at the Development Committee 
meeting of the IMF and World Bank in September 2005. The WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration in 
December 2005 invited the Director-General to create a task force that shall provide recommendations on 
how to operationalise Aid for Trade (WTO WT/MIN(05)/W/3/Rev.2).  
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Despite these positive signs, questions remain about the extent of the coherence between aid and trade in 
agriculture. The global volume of assistance to agriculture in 2002 (expressed in 2002 prices) was at its 
lowest level for the past thirty years even if it recovered somewhat to €2.9 billion (in 2002 prices) in 2003 
(Matthews, 2005). Greater priority for assistance to global public goods important for the livelihoods of 
poor people is warranted, such as generating productive new technologies for the sustainable management 
of land and water, forest and marine resources; controlling trans-boundary pests and diseases; conserving 
agro-biodiversity and rehabilitating degraded lands. New and more innovative ways of providing aid to 
agricultural sector development need to be created, including through involving the private sector and 
voluntary groups. Under the SPS Agreement, developed countries are to provide technical assistance to 
developing countries, to help them meet SPS requirements, but there is some evidence that this aid is 
poorly focused (Wiig and Kolstad, 2005). 
 
Assistance for trade adjustment, especially where this is due to preference erosion, is also contentious. One 
issue in this debate is whether the provision of compensation for preference erosion is a bilateral or 
multilateral responsibility. Because the most important preferences originate in unilateral trade policy 
decisions by OECD countries, it is argued that it is up to those countries responsible for preference erosion 
to bear the burden of offsetting it. On the other hand, because trade liberalisation is a global public good, 
proposals have also been put forward for a multilateral preference erosion compensation fund. These issues 
have a particular resonance in the policy coherence and agriculture debate because the existence of tariff 
peaks makes preferences in this sector particularly valuable. 
 
Developing country policy coherence 
 
Developing countries too have a responsibility to ensure that their domestic policies are consistent with the 
Millennium Development Goal objectives and to facilitate adequate supply responses. Specifically, in the 
case of agriculture, this requires developing countries to follow consistent and credible economic policies 
which encourage private investment; to adopt trade policies that are not biased against primary production 
and exports; and to make the public investment in infrastructure, technical development, and credit which 
is necessary for modernising production and improving competitiveness. Much progress has been made in 
reducing the negative bias against agriculture in macroeconomic and trade policies, but it still does not get 
the attention it deserves as the main source of livelihoods for poor people, particularly in the world’s 
poorest countries. Government investment in agriculture as a percentage of GDP remains very low in many 
developing countries. 
 
Policy coherence analysis for agriculture 
 
Based on ongoing research to investigate the impact of EU and OECD agricultural policy reform on the six 
partner countries of Ireland’s aid programme in sub-Saharan Africa, the following checklist of actions is 
suggested to the development policy community seeking to bring about greater policy coherence between 
domestic agricultural policy and development objectives. 
 
1.  Create institutional mechanisms to ensure that the development perspective is taken into account 
when agricultural policy or policy reform is being formulated. As the discussion in this paper 
makes clear, this means more than links with agricultural Ministries, but also requires links with 
trade Ministries and agencies concerned with setting and monitoring food safety standards, 
intellectual property rights issues, and environmental protection. 
2.  Undertake empirical study of the impacts of higher world food prices for the developing country 
partners of your development assistance programme. While the more sophisticated studies now use 
general equilibrium modelling for this purpose, for policy purposes it may often be sufficient to   14
adopt a more direct and transparent approach using partial equilibrium modelling or even impact 
analysis applying price changes derived from published studies.  
3.  Trace through the likely impact of border price changes on the distribution of rents within your 
developing country partners. Our research in Tanzania and Uganda shows that there is very limited 
price transmission of border prices to domestic farmgate and consumer prices within these 
countries, suggesting that changes in world prices are absorbed in the marketing chain. Thus the 
initial impacts on producer and consumer surplus, as shown in Table 4, would need to be modified 
to take into account the way in which changes in border prices are dissipated along the marketing 
chain. 
4.  Examine the feasibility of potential export increases in the light of known SPS barriers. For 
example, projected livestock or meat export increases to high-value markets may not be feasible if 
the country’s disease status does not allow it. This may suggest actions to try to relax these 
constraints, for example, by assisting in disease eradication, or helping to upgrade slaughtering 
capacity to meet OECD country standards.  
5.  Undertake a poverty profile using household budget survey data to identify the households likely 
to be affected by the modified agricultural price changes, whether consumers or producers. 
Commodity price changes from published studies will provide some of the required data to 
estimate the impacts on consumption bundles, but poverty researchers stress in addition the 
importance of factor market changes and changes in government revenue which will usually 
require output from general equilibrium models. The purpose of the poverty profile is to identify 
households which are specialised in producing particular crop combinations or in consuming food 
products likely to be affected either positively or negatively by agricultural policy reform. 
6.  Prepare a trade-proofing of development assistance activities in relation to the impacts of 
agricultural policy reform. What investments need to be supported if the recipient country is to be 
helped to take advantage of new trade opportunities?  Is there a need to strengthen social safety 
nets to prevent an increase in the number of households living in poverty? How is policy dialogue 
with recipient countries being used to encourage aid recipients to develop policies more coherent 
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